%This version sent to Moss on 1/5/96
\documentstyle[]{article}
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\title{Prolegomena to A Theory of Disability}
\author{John Perry, Elizabeth Macken, David Israel}
\date{\today}

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\begin{document}

%\baselineskip=22pt

\maketitle
%\bibliographystyle{plain}
\section{Introduction}

A theory of knowledge is at the same time a theory of error, of what
can go wrong, of how attempts at, or claims to knowledge can fail.
Similarly, a theory of action and ability is also a theory of
inability and provides the conceptual basis for an account of
disability.  In this paper, we use the account of the structure of
action developed in \cite{IPT91,IPT93}, hereafter ``IPT'', to sketch
an account of ability and disability.  The plan of the paper is as
follows.

In Part 2, we go over central features of the IPT account.
In Part 3 we use this analysis to discuss some important
concepts in the disability field. Our aim is to provide a
certain perspective on disability, particularly with respect
to (i) the distinction between disability and handicap and
(ii) the concept of accommodation, central to the Americans
With Disabilities Act ({\sc ADA}).  Towards the end of Part 3 we
suggest the importance of distinguishing between
accommodation via changes in the {\it infrastructure} of the
work situation and accommodation via the provision of {\it
tools}.  This distinction is particularly needed in thinking
about accommodation in connection with computing technology.
In Part 4, we add the concept of enablement to the IPT
framework, which allows us to discuss the
tool/infrastructure distinction within that framework in
Part 5.

%The present abstract consists of essentially complete versions of the
%first two parts of the paper, and a sketch of the third part.



\section{The IPT Analysis}
\subsection{Executions and Accomplishments}

The key idea of IPT is that we can assign relations to types of
movements, that are analogous to (and perhaps a generalization of) the
meanings that are assigned to types of utterances in situation
semantics.  Consider, for example, the type of movement one makes when
pushing an elevator button.  In different circumstances, a movement of
this type will bring about different results.  Standing in front of an
elevator, it will call the elevator to one's floor; standing in front
of an angry brute, it will cause one to get beat up, and perhaps to
lose the offending digit.  Think of the circumstances as the context
(discourse situation and connective situation, for those with good
memories), and replace the described situation with the resulting
situation, and the familiar pattern will emerge.  Then think of the
both the circumstances and resulting situation as characterized by
propositions, and you have the basic concept of IPT, the meaning of a
type of movement.

In somewhat more detail: Let $m$ be a variable over movements and $M$
over movement types.  Then we define the meaning of $M$, $\Lbrack M \Rbrack$,
in terms of a  constraint of a certain kind:

\begin{description}

\item[(*)] Any movement $m$ that is of type $M$, that is
effected in circumstances of type $C(x_{1}, \ldots ,x_{n},
m)$, will have as a result that $P(x_{i}, \ldots ,x_{l})$
($1 \leq i \leq l \leq n$), 

\item[]where the $x_{i}$ are additional
parameters for objects and relations involved in $C$.
\end{description}


Given (*), we can associate a relation between (types of)
circumstances, and (types of) results with the movement type $M$.  
Now we define $\Lbrack M \Rbrack$ as this relation:

\begin{quote}
$\Lbrack M \Rbrack (C, P)$ iff (*).\footnote{Note that neither $C$ nor
$P$ is quite a proposition.  They are both parametric propositions.}
\end{quote}



In IPT, movements are acts.  Acts are particulars, actions are
properties of agents at times.  An act is identified by an agent, a
location, a time and a type of movement.  Agents have
action-properties in virtue of being the agents of the acts.  We
recognize two kinds of actions.  {\it Executions} are properties that
acts have locally and non-circumstantially, in virtue of the type of
movement that the agent produces.  Where $M$ is a movement type,
${\cal E}[M]$ is the property of producing a movement of type $M$.
{\it Accomplishments} are properties that agents have in virtue of the
results they bring about, and so in virtue of the circumstances in
which their acts occur, as well as the type of movement involved.  The
execution/accomplishment distinction is analogous to the
direct/indirect discourse distinction, in characterizing utterances.
Where $P$ is a proposition, we use ${\cal B}[P]$ to denote the
property of bringing it about that $P$.


\subsection{Way of and Modes of}

A key concept in IPT, and one of particular importance in thinking
about disabilities, is that of one action being a {\it way of}
performing another action.  In IPT we factor this into two relations.
$MO$ (for {\it mode of}) is a relation between executions and
accomplishments, and $WO$ (for {\it way of}) is a relation between
accomplishments.  So moving one's left ring finger is a mode of
bringing it about that an ``s'' appears on one's computer screen, while
bringing it about that an ``s'' appears on my screen may be a way of
bringing it about that a message gets sent.

But of course getting those results doesn't just depend on which
movement one executes.  It also depends on the circumstances an agent
is in.  One has to have one's hands poised over a keyboard, the
keyboard has to be connected to a computer, which has to be turned on,
etc.  Note that more must be said about the circumstances in the
second case than in the first; the agent must be in a mail program of
a certain sort, etc. So the {\it mode of} and {\it way of} relations
are not just relations between actions, but relations relation between
actions and circumstances.  And in the background, always, are
constraints.

Here are the definitions:

\begin{itemize}
\item Executing $M$ is a mode of bringing it about that {\bf
P} in circumstances $C$ iff any movement of type $M$ in
circumstances $C$ will have the result that {\bf P}. In our
notation:
\item[] $MO({\cal E}[M],{\cal B}[P], C)$,  iff $[\![M]\!](C,P)$. 


\item Bringing it about that {\bf P} is a way of bringing it about
that {\bf Q} in {\bf C} if any $M$ whose execution is a mode
of bringing it about that {\bf P} in {\bf C}, is also a mode
of bringing it about that {\bf Q} in {\bf C}.  In our
notation:

\item[] $WO({\cal B}[{\bf P}], {\cal B}[{\bf Q}], {\bf C})
\;\mbox{iff}$ 

\item[]$(\forall M)\; \mbox{if} \;  MO({\cal E}[M],{\cal B}[{\bf P}],
{\bf C}) \; \mbox{then} \;  MO({\cal E}[M], {\cal B}[{\bf Q}], {\bf C})$.


\end{itemize}


\section{Disability and  Accomplishment}

\subsection{Impairment, Disability and Handicap}

Our abilities to accomplish things depend  on two factors, our
being able to execute certain movements, and those executions being
ways of accomplishing various things.  The second factor, in turn,
depends on the circumstances that hold.  So, having an ability to
accomplish something doesn't simply depend on the movements one can
execute, but also on the circumstances that hold.

This is worth emphasizing because it suggest two rather different ways
one can think of individuals with disabilities.  One view to take,
natural enough, but on reflection quite flawed, goes like this:

\bq
A disabled individual is one that cannot make some movement that the 
rest of us can make, or lacks some sensory capacity the rest of us 
have.  Normal, non-disabled people can find out what they need  by 
using their senses; individuals with disabilities cannot; they need 
special help.  And normal, non-disabled individuals can do what they 
need to do; individuals with disabilities cannot; they need special 
help.
\eq

Perhaps something like this was true at one time, but in the modern
world the non-disabled as well as the disabled need to rely on the ways
society, culture and technology have augmented ``natural
circumstances'' to do the things they need and want to do.  A vast
infrastructure augments the effects of our acts.

A similar point can be made about the information we get.  What we can
learn from looking and listening and touching doesn't depend just on
the meanings our perceptual experiences have as a matter of nature,
but on the meanings these experiences have in virtue of society,
culture and technology.

We should see ourselves as agents that manifest intelligence by
converting information to action; by finding out what our
circumstances are like, and acting in ways that promote our desires,
given that we are in those circumstances.  Our intelligent, purposeful
life depends on a great interlocking network of relationships among
types.  The circumstances we can detect with our senses tell us a
great deal about the world beyond our senses, thanks in no small part
to relations of meaning that are established and sustained by culture
and technology.  The movements we make have effects far beyond their
immediate effects on the objects we hold and poke and kick and project
our voices at, because of the world created by culture and technology.


This suggests a second perspective on disability: individuals with
disabilities are not those who need special help, but those who have
been left out---not having been aided via the particular forms of
help---augmentations of the natural informational and pragmatic
relations---that culture and technology have provided for the majority
of their fellows.  However, we prefer not to put it in quite this way.

Following the World Health Organization
\cite{WHO}
we distinguish among impairment, disability and
handicap.\footnote{Throughout, we focus on the motor rather than the
sensory side, but analogous points could be made for our information
gathering abilities and disabilities as well.}

\bi

\item An {\it impairment} is a  physiological loss, injury
disorder or other condition.
\item A {\it disability} is a loss of ability to execute
some class of movements.
\item A {\it handicap} is an inability to accomplish
something, that most others  around one are able to
accomplish.
\ei

Given this understanding of handicap, disabilities are not the only
source of handicaps.  Ignorance of Japanese, for example, handicaps
the present authors when in Japan, for they cannot do many of the
things, such as read the signs, that most people around them can do.

Someone who has lost his legs, and someone whose legs
are paralyzed, would have different impairments, but the
same disability.  

Whether these individuals were handicapped is another matter.  In the
first place, being handicapped is a relational notion.  First it is
relative to a goal or purpose.  Their disabilities may handicap them
with respect to some goals but not others.  But secondly, being
handicapped is a matter of circumstance.  A disability may handicap a
person in one circumstance, but not in another.  A paraplegic without
a wheelchair may not be handicapped for reading, but be handicapped
for moving from room to room.  A paraplegic with a wheelchair, but in
circumstances in which there are stairs but no elevator or ramp, will
be handicapped relative to the goal of moving from one level to
another.

Handicaps can be removed by a change in circumstances, that makes an
accomplishment available to an agent that was not available before.

Handicaps can also be induced by a change of circumstances, when this
change makes actions available to most people, but not to all.  And
this is a different way of looking at individuals with disabilities:
they are often handicapped by technological innovations that make
accomplishments available, perhaps to most of the people around them,
but only to those with the standard mix of sensory and motor
abilities.  And this is often quite needless.
%Betsy---good examples?  The GUI is our class but we need
%something on the motor side

\subsection{Reasonable Accommodation}


The Americans With Disabilities Act requires that ``reasonable
accommodation'' be made for people with disabilities in a host of
areas, including employment.  For example, Title I, Section
102, 5A, says that employers must make

\bq

...reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who
is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of the business ...  (section 5A of Employment section, see below).
      
\eq

Such a law naturally raises many questions.  A great deal of
interpretation of the {\sc ADA} has been provided by government
agencies, but considerable murkiness remains.  For example,
the tripartite classification of the World Health
Organization, which we find helpful, has for the most part
not been integrated into literature on the {\sc ADA}.  As lawsuits
involving the {\sc ADA} reach the courts and the interpretive
literature grows, we feel that there is room for logical analysis
and ontology to add structure and distinctions that will
clarify the issues.

A simple gloss on the {\sc ADA} text might be this:

\bq
If it's not too expensive, an employer has to make those
accomplishments that are relevant to the job available to a disabled
employee, so the employee will not be handicapped in performing the
job.
\eq


Here are some examples of reasonable accommodation.  A person who is a 
skilled computer operator uses a wheelchair.  To get to his workstation he 
needs to enter the building, but he cannot do so because there are stairs.  
Installing a ramp would be, under most circumstances, reasonable 
accommodation.

In this case, the wheelchair user is not given an alternative way of
doing everything that a non-disabled worker can do.  A non-disabled
worker will climb the stairs; the wheelchair user will not climb them,
but will still get to the higher level.  The ramp provides a different
way of getting there.

Compare now two office workers, one using a wheelchair, the other
climbing the stairs.  In terms of IPT, the two workers {\it execute}
different movements.  The one moves his legs, the other his arms.  So
the executions are different.  But both get to the same landing.  The
accomplishments are the same.

On the IPT analysis, executing a movement is a mode of accomplishing a
result, {\it given} certain circumstances and {\it given} certain
constraints.  The conditions that are exploited and the constraints
that are relied upon are different in the two cases also.  Moving
one's legs in a certain way is a way of getting to the landing in
virtue of the fact that there are stairs, and various constraints
having to do with the ways legs and stairs interact.  But moving one's
arms in a certain way is a way of getting to the landing, given the
fact that the second worker is sitting in a wheelchair, that there is
a ramp, and given the constraints that govern the way wheels operate
on ramps.

To describe this simple idea of reasonable accommodation, then, one
naturally brings in all of the conceptual equipment that we have seen
IPT provide: the difference between executions and accomplishments,
the relativity to circumstance, and the relativity to constraint.  But
we also need something else: the notion of {\it enablement}.
%[[But:  we need to get at wheelchair vs ramp diff, and we
%need to think about computers.]]


\section{Enablement}

Much of what we do is done with an eye to making other things we want
to accomplish possible.  In this section, we will first talk about the
general notion of enablement: that is, of doing something that changes
the circumstances so that ways of doing things are available that were
not available before.  Consider our earlier example of sending e-mail
by depressing the ``s'' key on your keyboard.  Note that turning on the
computer or even composing a message in your mail program are not ways
of sending e-mail, though they may be said to be parts of the action
of sending an e-mail message.\footnote{When people speak of parts of
plans or of procedures, they may mean any of a number of things: in
particular, they may be referring to an enabling action or to an
action that is a way of doing something else.} Rather the computer's
being on and your having composed a message in your mail program are
necessary conditions, not just for sending e-mail, but for your
depressing the ``s'' key to be a way to send e-mail (indeed to send that
very message that you've composed), and for your moving your left hand
and, in particular your ring finger on that hand, to be a mode of
sending-email.  And they are necessary conditions that can themselves
be brought into being by doing things. 

We say that one action (execution or accomplishment) {\it enables} an
another, typically an accomplishment, relative to a circumstance,
$\mbox{{\bf E}}(A, {\cal B}[Q], C)$, if and only if

\bi
\item  $\exists A^{\prime}, P$ such that $WO/MO(A, {\cal
B}[P], C)\, \\ \& 
\; WO/MO(A^{\prime}, {\cal B}[Q], C \sqcap P)$
\ei 

In our case, let the initial circumstances ($C$) be that you
are sitting at a computer that is already turned on and that
you are using your mail program.  In these circumstances you
can move your fingers in certain ways ($A$) and thereby
compose a message {\cal B}[P].  Adding this accomplishment
to the circumstances gives us $C \sqcap P$.  In these new
circumstances there is something, namely depressing the
``s'' key ($A^{\prime}$), that is a way of sending the
message.  So moving your fingers in a certain way enables
you to send a message, although it doesn't by itself
constitute sending the message.  You may be all ready to
send it, and then think better of it.

Notice that in the above, we have assumed the existence of a great
deal of technological infrastructure---the existence of computers, and
of networks of computers of various kinds, of course, and of certain
types of software.  If these weren't available, none of us would be able
to send e-mail messages.\footnote{There is also, of course, the
existence and well-functioning of the larger electrical systems within
which the computers live.} The existence of this infrastructure can be
said, in turn, to enable all of our computing activities.  Here it is
not something the agent does that is enabling; it is rather a
condition, a type of circumstance, brought about by culture, society,
technology that is enabling.

\section{Providing Tools versus Providing Infrastructure}

Let us say that an accomplishment
 ${\cal B}[P]$ is available to an agent $a$
at location $l$ if there is a movement $M$ that the agent can execute, and
$MO({\cal E}[M], {\cal B}[P], C(l,a))$.

Now if there is an accomplishment that most agents have
available, but a particular agent does not, so that agent is
handicapped, there are three things one can do.  First, once
can change the movements that the agent can execute.  In the
context of disability, this means curing or repairing the
impairment, and thus removing the disability and the
handicap.  A major theme of the political and social
movements that led to the {\sc ADA} was that society has
tended to focus to much on impairment removal as a way of
dealing with disability, rather than providing tools and
infrastructure, the other two methods.

These methods involve changing the circumstances so that the
movements the agent can make, become modes of accomplishing
new things.  We distinguish between two different kinds of
enabling changes of circumstances:

\be
\item Those that change the affordances at a location: thereby making
available new modes/ways of doing things at that location
\item Those that change the abilities for an agent: thereby making it
possible for the agent to do things it couldn't do before.
\ee

\noindent {\it Providing infrastructure} changes the
affordances at a location.  {\it Providing tools} changes
abilities for an agent.  These two changes interact, of
course, either when the tool is designed to fit into and
work within a certain kind of infrastructure or when an
infrastructure grows up around a certain kind of tool or
ensemble of tools.

Start with a target accomplishment ${\cal B}(H)$, one that
is available to many agents, but with respect to which
others are handicapped.  The job is to create circumstances
in which the handicapped agents have new ways accomplishing
${\cal B}(H)$.

To accomplish ${\cal B}(H)$, an agent needs to have some
accomplishment he can do, ${\cal B}(G)$, which is a way of
${\cal B}(H)$. So two things are necessary. (i) ${\cal B}(G)$
must be a way of accomplishing ${\cal B}(H)$; (ii) the agent
must be able to accomplish ${\cal B}(G)$.  

When we  provide tools we give individuals a new range
of accomplishments, which they can use (given the proper
infrastructure) to overcome many handicaps.  When we provide
infrastructure, we create way of relations between things
people can do (given the proper tools) and goals relative to
which they are handicapped.  

By building a ramp, an employer provides a bit of
infrastructure that removes a handicap for those who have
wheelchairs.  By using a wheelchair, an agent has a tool
that removes a handicaps, in locations that have ramps.  As
a first pass, one might divide responsibility for removing
handicaps along these lines; an individual with a disability
should be equipped (by themselves, family, or government
agency) with tools like wheelchairs that make widely useful
sorts of action, such as movement, available to them;
employers should accommodate, by providing the infrastructure
that allows those actions to be ways of performing the tasks
essential to a job.  

On issues of mobility, there seems to be a consensus on
this division of responsibility: we don't
expect people to provide their own ramps, and we don't
expect employers to supply wheelchairs.  But in the cases
involving computers and other technological equipment,
things are not always so clear.  The traditional approach is
to add accessibility hardware and software to the computers
that individuals with disabilities are assigned to use.
This is problematic, though; it adds to the cost of
promoting such an individual, for example, whenever such a
promotion would mean equipping a new computer system with
the needed accessibility devices.  One solution is to
require all accessibility devices be available on all
computers---but this is not only prohibitively expensive,
but in some cases impossible.  A third approach is to try to
develop systems which allow for an ``ramp-wheelchair'' type
of distinction.  The concept of the
``Total Access System'' developed in the Archimedes Project
at Stanford is an attempt to do this.\cite{ARCH}

In the paper of which this is an abstract, we will
develop the tool/infrastructure distinction precisely within
the IPT structure, in a way that will lead us to a
discussion of how the pattern of constraints exploited
differs depending on whether one is providing tools or providing
infrastructure.  To do this, it will be necessary to develop
a multi-agent version of IPT and of enablement.  


\begin{thebibliography}{99} 

\bibitem{ARCH} http://www-csli.stanford.edu/arch/research.html

\bibitem{IPT91} Israel, David, John Perry and Syun Tutiya.
``Actions and Movements.''  In {\em Proceedings of IJCAI-'91},
Mountain View, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, August, 1991.

\bibitem{IPT93} Israel, David, John Perry and Syun Tutiya.  
``Executions, Motivations and Accomplishments.''
{\it The Philosophical Review} (October, 1993): 515--40.

\bibitem{WHO} {\it International classification of impairments,
disabilities, and handicaps: a manual of classification
relating to the consequences of disease.}  Geneva: World
Health Organization, 1980.  205p.

\end{thebibliography} 




%\bibliography{action-biblio}



\end{document}


********************************














We want to suggest that the fundamental concept needed for dealing with 
these issues is ``a way of doing something'', or, in IPT,

\bi
\item[] A is a way of doing B in conditions C given constraint K
\ei







Here we probably need to make some distinctions among kinds
of circumstances.  For example,

1.	The sort of circumstance that involves a artificial
	limb or glasses; a prosthesis; something that
	connects directly with the organs or muscles that
	are impaired.

2.	The sort of circumstance that having a wheelchair is
	an example of.  Here there is a device that connects
	to/is operated by different parts and muscles than
	the ones that are impaired.

3.	The sort of circumstance that having the cups  on a
	low shelf is an example of.  One can do things (get
	a cup) that other people can do, because the
	``external'' circumstances have kept the cups within
	reach.

4.	Similar distinctions having to do with perception?




2.	In the Archimedes mission statement we talk about
	the need for "equal access to information".  But
	this obviously needs some working out.  It can't	
	just be a universal absolute prohibition on anything
	that isn't accessible to a deaf-blind person.  But
	it shouldn't just be an empty exhortation.  

	What is needed is an account that would allow one to
	talk about the cost and benefits in some principled
	way.
	

	This also ties into the themes in the six principles
	about information/form of information and the
	distinction between handicap and disability (and
	impairment).

3.	The idea is that the theory of action gives us a way
	of talking about some of this---at least a
	beginning.

	The key ideas there are:

		Executions vs. accomplishments

		An execution is a mode of accomplishing
		something in certain circumstances given
		certain constraints:

		MO(E(M), B(P), C, Co)

		Accomplishing one thing is a way of accomplishing
		something else in certain circumstances
		given certain constraints:

		WO(B(P), B(Q), C, Co)

	A (workable) plan or recipe for B(P) involves having B(P) as a
	goal, having some movement M one can execute, and
	having circumstances and constraints so that there
	is a chain of MO and WO relations that link the
	movement with the goal.  So, eventually, we have:

		MO(E(M), B(P), C, Co)

	Where M is a movement the person can do, P is what
	they want to bring about, C is the actual
	circumstances and Co the actual constraints.


4.	Given this, what is it to be handicapped given our
	definition?   Suppose B(P) is a goal that a lot of
	people have, and E(M) is a way of bringing it about
	in the ordinary circumstances given the ordinary
	constraints. 

	A person is disabled if they can't E(M) for the
	usual M.

	They are handicapped, if that means they can't
	B(P)---ie, if the 

		MO(E(M), B(P), C, Co) 

	is the only available strategy.

	
5.	We can then distinguish various responses:

	change your goal  (Eg, disabled students are often
	dissuaded from careers in technology and science and
	told to become counselors)

	change your repertoire of movements (get "fixed".
	Eg, give up being a very adept wheel-chair user to
	become a really awkward walker.)

	change the conditions and constraints to provide and
	alternative recipe for getting the goal, an

		MO(E(M"), B(P), C", Co") 

	where M" is something the disabled person can do, and
	C" and Co" are changes that are made in the
	environment, say through technology.

6.	This is the Archimedes approach---not try to fix the
	person, or change their goals, but provide the
	technology (lever) that changes the conditions and
	constraints.

7.	Now given all this, what kind of measure could we
	get between the standard recipes required to enable
	a person with a disability to reach a goal, that
	would enable us to give a reasonable but
	non-vacuous statement of the Mission statement?

		Eg, speech access is reasonable for a wide
		variety of cases.

		
	Could the three of us brainstorm about this?





\section{Basic distinctions in the theory of action}



\end{document}




\begin{thebibliography}{99}



%\bibitem{BR} Bratman, Michael. {\em Intention, Plans and
%--Practical Reason}.  Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
%Press, 1987.

\end{thebibliography}


\section{definitions}

Webster Definition for "disability"

dis.abil.i.ty \.dis-*-'bil-*t-e-\ n 1a: the condition of being disabled 1b: inability to pursue an
occupation because of physical or mental impairment 2a: lack of legal qualification to do something
2b: a nonlegal disqualification, restriction, or disadvantage 


Webster Definition for "inability"

in.abil.i.ty \.in-*-'bil-*t-e-\ n [ME inabilite, fr. MF inhabilite`, fr. in- + habilite`X ability : the
quality or state of being unable 


\section{{\sc ADA} text}

  SEC. 102. DISCRIMINATION.
    (a) General Rule.--No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
  individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
  regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge
  of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
  conditions, and privileges of employment.
    (b) Construction.--As used in subsection (a), the term "discriminate"
  includes--
        (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
      in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such
      applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or
      employee;
        (2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship
      that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant
      or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this
      title (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or
      referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits
      to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing
      training and apprenticeship programs);
        (3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration--
            (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of
          disability; or
            (B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
          common administrative control;
        (4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a
      qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual
      with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
      association;
        (5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
      mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
      who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
      demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
      operation of the business of such covered entity; or
        (B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who
      is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is
      based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation
      to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant;
        (6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
      criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
      disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the
      standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered
      entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is
      consistent with business necessity; and
        (7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the
      most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a
      job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs sensory,
      manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the
      skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee
      that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired
      sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except
      where such skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).
    (c) Medical Examinations and Inquiries.--

-----
\footnote{\begin{description} 

\item[SCR-2] An act $A$ is determined by
an agent $\alpha$, a time $t$ and movement $m$.  A
complex $K$ of cognitions {\it motivates} $A$ if
it causes  a volition $v$ to $M$ (in the right way) that causes
$m$ (in the right way), and $K$ {\it rationalizes} $A$.  $K$
rationalizes $A$ if $K$ contains:

\begin{enumerate}
\item a desire:  $Q$;
\item a belief:  $C$;
\item a belief-how:  $ \langle MO, {\cal E}[M], {\cal B}[Q^{\ast}], C^{\ast} \rangle $.

\end{enumerate}

Let $a$ be an anchor that represents the way $\alpha$'s
ideas and notions are connected to the world. $A$ will be
{\it successful} with respect to the content of his desire,
$Q[a]$, if the contents of $\alpha$'s beliefs (2)-(3) as
anchored by $a$ are true and  $m$ is of type $M$.

\end{description}}



\section{This is far as I got Wednesday evening.}

\subsection{Some stray stuff}




cosmetic disfigurement or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems:  neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense
organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine."  Impairment also means "any mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."

Disability includes such conditions, diseases and infections as
"orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments; cerebral palsy;
epilepsy; muscular dystrophy; multiple sclerosis; cancer; heart
disease; diabetes; tuberculosis; drug addiction and alcoholism."



In the Archimedes project we use the term  ``disability'' to
refer to a functional loss: a movement a person might be
unable to make; a mode of perception they do not have.  So
quadriplegia is a disability;  blindness is a disability.
Disability is functional; ``impairment'' is the word for the
injury or disease that leads to the disability.

``Handicap''  on the other hand refers to an inability to
perform some task or gain some information that everyone
else can do or get.  For example,  President Roosevelt  had
 infantile paralysis leaving the muscles in his legs
 damaged.  As a result  of this impairment he had a
 disability; he could  not move his legs.  As a result of
 this  disability he was handicapped in many legs.  He could
 not walk unaided;  he could not run; he could not stand up
 and reach things on high shelves, and so forth.

But the  step from disability to handicap involves the
environment or circumstances of the individual with a
disability as  well as the disability itself.  There are
many handicaps Roosevelt didn't have that he might have had,
because he was able to control his circumstances.


